Abstract-Recently, Chien proposed a time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme based on tamper-resistant devices, which improves the performance in terms of the computational efforts and the implementation costs. Later, Santis et al. demonstrated a collusion attack on Chien's scheme to show that collusive malicious insiders can cooperatively derive some encryption keys and further proposed an improvement to eliminate the security flaws inherent in Chien's scheme. In this paper, we will prove that Santis et al.'s key derivation is incorrect and their claimed security requirements cannot be achieved. On the other hand, we will further propose a new key derivation to improve the weakness in Santis et al., scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the real world, there are several examples of hierarchies such as military, government units, business companies, and etc. All users in such a system form a user hierarchy and can be assigned into a number of disjoint sets of security classes, say } , , , { 2 1 n C C C C = , which is partially ordered by a binary relation " ≤ ". The symbol " i j C C ≤ " means that the security level of class j C is lower than or equal to that of the class i C . It also implies that the users in the security class i C can access to the information held by those in the class j C , while the opposite is not allowed. For instance, a business company can be regarded as a partially ordered hierarchy. All users in a business company are assigned to the different security classes according to their responsibilities such as top management, divisions, and departments. There are several projects in a department. Members of a project team can have access rights to their project, but are unable to access information about other projects. A manager of a division is authorized to access information in all departments and projects within that division. Hence, it is important to determine the access privilege management for a partially ordered hierarchy to resolve above access control problems. In 1983, Akl and Taylor [1] first proposed a cryptographic key assignment scheme in an arbitrary partial order set (POSET) hierarchy in order to solve the access control problems. MacKinnon et al., [2] algorithm, called the canonical algorithm, to reduce the number of public parameters as compared with Akl and Taylor's scheme [1] . Sandhu [3] addressed a novel cryptographic solution to access control problem for the special case of a rooted tree hierarchy. The keys for security classes are iteratively generated by using one-way functions. This approach is easier for implementation.
Harn and Lin [4] proposed a bottom-up key generation scheme, instead of using a top-down approach as in the Akl and Taylor's scheme. The results showed that Harn and Lin's scheme is not only more efficient in the memory utilization since it needs less space to keep public information, but also can handle new user's insertion without changing all keys. Some interesting applications have become more prevalent, for example, electronic paper subscription and digital TV broadcasting. In these applications, a user may be assigned to a certain class for only a period of time. The users need distinct keys to encrypt their data in different time periods. The implementation of conventional key assignment schemes [1] - [7] required users to handle a large number of keys, which are impractical and inefficient for implementation.
In 2002, Tzeng [8] proposed a time-bound cryptographic key assignment scheme in which the cryptographic keys of a class is distinct for each time period. Tzeng's scheme can be applied to broadcast encrypted data to authorized users through a broadcast channel and to construct a flexible cryptographic key backup system. However, Tzeng's scheme is insecure against the collusion attack demonstrated by Yi and Ye [9] . A coalition of classes with distinct time periods can cooperate to compute unauthorized keys that they should not be able to learn. To improve Tzeng's scheme, Chien [10] later proposed a new time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme that employed a low-cost tamper-resistant device to perform simple arithmetic operations. Chien's scheme reduces the implementation costs and the computational loads. Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci [11] recently showed that Chien's scheme is still vulnerable to collusion attack which is contrary to his claimed security requirements. That is, some malicious users can collusively to extend the time period of their secret keys. Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci [12] further proposed an improvement to eliminate the security flaws inherent in Chien's scheme. This paper, however, will demonstrate the incorrectness of Santis et al.'s scheme. That is, the key derivation will fail in Santis et al.'s scheme, which implies their scheme cannot achieve the claimed security requirements. We finally will propose an improved scheme to correct Santis et al., scheme.
Rest of this paper is sketched as follows. In Section II, we will review Santis et al., scheme [12] . In Section III, we will demonstrate the incorrectness of Santis et al., scheme and A Robust Time-Bound Hierarchical Key Assignment Scheme
Yu-Li Lin, Chien-Lung Hsu, and Yu-Hao Chuang propose an improvement. Finally, we give conclusions in Section IV II. REVIEW OF SANTIS ET Al. .'S SCHEME user registration, the key generation, and the key derivation phases. In the initialization phase, a trusted agent (TA) determines all system parameters. In the user registration phase, a user can join the system and be assigned a secret key according to his security class. In the key generation phase, TA will determine a secret key for encrypting data belonging to each class at each time period. In the key derivation phase, the legal user can use his own secret key to derive the encrypting key for his class or lower class at some time period. Suppose the system has n disjoint classes, . Detailed descriptions of these phases are given below. . Initially, the trusted agent TA determines his own secret key X and a secure one-way hash function h, and randomly chooses two secret values, a and b, as the time-bound seeds for time periods. TA determines a secret key i k for each class i C (for i = 1, 2, …, n) and a public value
secret key i k to the temper-resistant device. The device performs the following steps to derive the decryption key , j t K :
Step 1. Use the public information ij r and i C 's secret key
Step 2 Step 3. Derive j C 's secret key
If there exists some class(es) between i C and j C , the user i U can use above method to iteratively derive the secret key(s) of l C 's, where
All above steps will be performed iteratively by the same way.
III. INCORRECTNESS AND IMPROVEMENT OF SANTIS ET AL., SCHEME
In this section, we will show the incorrectness of 
U has to perform the computations iteratively by the following equations: 
protected by the one-way hash function. Based on the intractability of reversing the one-way hash function, it can be seen that the user i U cannot derive the secret keys,
For example, the set of classes is organized as a user hierarchy such as Fig. 1 . As shown in Fig. 1 
Since the security of Santis et al.'s scheme is primarily assumed based on the intractability of reversing the one-way hash function h, the users in 1 C cannot derive 2 k from ) || ( 2 k X h . 
B. The Proposed Improvement
The incorrectness of Santis et al.'s scheme is caused by the fact that the secret key i k cannot be derived from the secret
. To eliminate this incorrectness, we can replace Eqs. (1) and (2) with Eqs. (1*) and (2*), respectively: Step 1. Use the public information ij r and i C 's secret key
Step 2.
All above steps will be performed iteratively by the same way. [12] .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated the incorrectness of Santis et al.'s scheme, which implies their scheme cannot achieve the claimed security requirements. That is, Santis et al. ' s key derivation only allows the users to derive the secret key for the direct successor of the intended class. The secret keys for all immediate successors of the intended class however cannot be derived, which is contrary to their claimed security requirements. We finally proposed an improvement to fix the pointed out problem.
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